2021 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

1-5-2021

J. Felix Mateo Guillen-Martin v. Attorney General United States

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021

Recommended Citation
"J. Felix Mateo Guillen-Martin v. Attorney General United States" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 3.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/3

This January is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2021 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 20-1499
___________
J. FELIX MATEO GUILLEN-MARTINEZ,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent
_______________________
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A215-928-617
(U.S. Immigration Judge: Alice S. Hartye)
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 12, 2020
Before: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.
(Filed January 5, 2021)

________________
OPINION*
________________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge
J. Felix Guillen-Martinez, a Mexican citizen, petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’s order dismissing his appeal and affirming the Immigration
Judge’s order denying cancellation of removal. In its decision, the Board agreed with the
Immigration Judge that Guillen-Martinez did not merit cancellation of removal as a
matter of discretion. Guillen-Martinez contends the Board and Immigration Judge failed
to apply the correct legal standard to the established facts. We disagree and will deny
Guillen-Martinez’s petition to the extent it raises a question of law. To the extent GuillenMartinez asks us to review the Board’s discretionary weighing of the equities, we will
dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
After the Government began proceedings to remove Guillen-Martinez, he
conceded removability but sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). At
the conclusion of Guillen-Martinez’s immigration hearing, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
denied his application for cancellation of removal. The IJ found that Guillen-Martinez did
not establish the requisite exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying
relative. In the alternative, the IJ found that Guillen-Martinez did not merit a grant of
cancellation as a matter of discretion. In making her discretionary determination, the IJ
balanced adverse factors evidencing Guillen-Martinez’s undesirability as a permanent
resident against positive factors supporting cancellation of removal. As for the positive
factors, the IJ highlighted that Guillen-Martinez has resided in the United States for over
two decades, has children who are U.S. citizens, has worked consistently, and his
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employer and his employer’s wife testified that he was a good worker whom they would
rehire. The IJ also reviewed the adverse factor of Guillen-Martinez’s criminal history,
which includes four DUI arrests leading to three convictions, as well as an arrest for a
domestic incident that did not lead to a conviction. The IJ concluded that GuillenMartinez’s “criminal history, particular[ly] the number of DUI arrests and convictions,
outweigh[s] the positive factors.” Guillen-Martinez appealed the IJ’s decision to the
Board.
The Board dismissed Guillen-Martinez’s appeal, agreeing with the IJ’s
determination that Guillen-Martinez did not merit cancellation of removal as a matter of
discretion based on his criminal history.1 The Board noted some of the factors favorable
to Guillen-Martinez, including his length of residence in the United States, his significant
family ties in the United States, and his employment history. But, ultimately, the Board
found that Guillen-Martinez’s record of arrests and convictions outweighed the positive
factors. Guillen-Martinez petitions for review.
II.
A.
An applicant for cancellation of removal must satisfy statutory eligibility
requirements, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), and establish he warrants relief as a matter of
discretion. In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 10 (BIA 1998). In exercising her discretion,
an IJ “must balance the adverse factors . . . with the social and humane considerations . . .
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In his brief, Guillen-Martinez raises challenges regarding the IJ’s exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship determination, but the Board declined to reach that finding,
and it is thus not before us.
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to determine whether the granting of . . . relief appears in the best interest of this
country.” In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 11 (last alteration in original) (quoting Matter
of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 584–85 (BIA 1978)). The existence of a criminal record is
an adverse factor, whereas evidence of genuine rehabilitation and evidence of hardship to
family members if the petitioner is removed are positive factors. Matter of Marin, 16 I. &
N. Dec. at 584–85.
We lack jurisdiction to review discretionary denials of cancellation of removal,
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), and may not “reweigh the proper factors and make our own
judgment call,” Hernandez-Morales v. Att’y Gen., 977 F.3d 247, 249 (3d. Cir 2020). But
we retain jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or questions of law.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(D).2 The phrase “‘questions of law’ includes the application of a legal
standard to established facts.” Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1072 (2020).
The Government contends we lack jurisdiction to review Guillen-Martinez’s
claim. To the extent Guillen-Martinez merely disagrees with the Board’s discretionary
balancing of the equities, the Government is correct. But the core of Guillen-Martinez’s
argument is that the Board and IJ failed to apply the proper standard to the established
facts.3 Specifically, Guillen-Martinez contends the Board and IJ failed to consider two
positive factors: rehabilitation from his criminal offenses and the hardship to his family
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We review issues of law and constitutional claims de novo. Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855
F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017).
3
Guillen-Martinez also contends the IJ’s consideration of crimes he committed more than
ten years prior to his application for cancellation of removal infringed upon his due
process rights. But Guillen-Martinez points to no law forbidding an IJ from considering
such crimes in making a discretionary determination.
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members if he were removed. We have jurisdiction to review whether the Board failed to
apply the proper factors. See Gomez-Perez v. Holder, 569 F.3d 370, 372–73 (8th Cir.
2009) (holding the court had jurisdiction where petitioner argued the Board “applied an
incorrect legal standard by focusing on the present circumstances of his children rather
than on the future hardships that they would face if he were removed” because that
argument raised a question of law); cf. Hernandez-Morales, 977 F.3d at 249 (noting that
we have jurisdiction over claims alleging the Board considered an improper legal factor).
We find, however, that the Board and IJ did consider the proper factors, including
rehabilitation and the hardship to Guillen-Martinez’s family members if he were
removed.
The Board noted that Guillen-Martinez had an employment history, significant
family ties, and equitable and humanitarian factors weighing in his favor. The IJ noted
that Guillen-Martinez loves and supports four children, all of whom live in the United
States, and recognized that Guillen-Martinez had not been arrested for DUI since 2007.
Accordingly, neither the Board nor the IJ ignored considerations of Guillen-Martinez’s
family or rehabilitation in making their determinations.4
Guillen-Martinez presented a sympathetic claim, but we find the Board and IJ
applied the correct legal standard to the established facts. We will deny his petition to the
extent it raises a question of law. To the extent Guillen-Martinez’s petition asks us to

4

While it would have been preferable for the Board and IJ to explicitly reference
rehabilitation and hardship to family members, we find no reason to doubt that the Board
and IJ considered those factors.
5

review the Board’s discretionary decision, we will grant the Government’s motion to
dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
III.
For the reasons provided, we will affirm the dismissal.
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